Judicial Review as a Constitutional Doctrine: Authority, Interpretation, and Democratic Contestation

• Ahesan Kabir

  PhD Researcher at University of Dhaka

  Author

Judicial review is often understood as a judicial power derived directly from constitutional supremacy. This article argues that such a view is conceptually incomplete. It re-conceptualizes judicial review as a constitutional doctrine that structures the allocation, contestation, and provisional settlement of interpretive authority among co-ordinate institutions of the state. The article pursues three objectives: to rethink judicial review as an institutional doctrine rather than a judicial monopoly; to examine its relationship with constitutional supremacy and the democratic tensions associated with claims of judicial finality; and to identify the conditions under which it can retain democratic legitimacy without institutional overreach. Methodologically, the study adopts a doctrinal and theoretical approach, combining structural constitutional reasoning with comparative analysis of the United Kingdom, the United States, India, and Bangladesh. It argues that judicial review functions as a mechanism for managing institutional disagreement, and that its legitimacy depends on doctrinal restraint, structural fidelity, and a dialogic understanding of constitutional interpretation.

1. Ahesan Kabir, PhD Researcher at University of Dhaka

   PhD Researcher At Institute of Social Welfare and Research, University of Dhaka

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